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ARTICLE 27 AND MEXICAN LAND REFORM:
THE LEGACY OF ZAPATA'S DREAM*
by James J. Kelly, Jr.**
Notlac ximomanaca! Nehuatl onacoc; oncuan on ipc tepoztli
ihuan nochantlaca niquinhuicatz. Ipampa in Totazin Diaz
aihmo ticnequi yehuatl techixotiz. Ticnequi occe altpetl achi
cuali. Ilhuan totlac ximomanaca ipampa amo nechpactia tlen
telaxtlauhia. Amo conehui ica tlacualo ica netzotzomatiloz.
Noihqui nincnequi nochtlacatl quipiaz ital: oncuan on
quitocaz ihuan quipixcaz tlaoli, yetzintli ihuan occequi
xinachtli. Tlen nanquitoa? Namehan totlac
namomanazque?***
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mexican Revolution began as an anti-reelection campaign
but ended as a struggle for land. In 1910, Porfirio Diaz was elected to
his eighth presidential term after having his principal opponent,
Francisco I. Madero, jailed. After his release, Madero declared the
* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Lisa Buonaccorsi Kelly, who encouraged me
to write on this subject and whose love and patience have made it possible. I would like
to acknowledge the inspiration provided by the lawyers and staff of the Despacho de
Orientaci6n y Asesoria Legal in Mexico City with whom I had the great pleasure of
spending the summer of 1992.
** B.A. University of Virginia (1987); J.D. Columbia University School of Law
(expected 1994). Head Notes Editor, Columbia Human Rights Law Review (1993-94). The
author would like to thank Katherine Mulhern, Lee Feldshon, Carrie Hazard, Doug Koff,
and Alejandro Garro for all the help they have given in the preparation of this Note.
*** Michael C. Meyer & William L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican History 507-
08 (1991) (quoting Fernando Horcastias, De Porfirio Diaz a Zapata: Memoria NAhuatl
de Milpa Alta 105 (1968)).
Join me. I rose up. I rose up in arms and I bring my countrymen. We
no longer wish that our Father Diaz watch over us. We want a much
better president. Rise up with us because we don't like what the rich
men pay us. It is not enough for us to eat and dress ourselves. I also
want everyone have his piece of land so that he can plant and
harvest corn, beans, and other crops. What do you say? Are you going
to join us?
Id. at 508 n.4 (translation from Ndhuatl in original). Zapata, a horse trainer from
Morelos, organized a peasant army soon after the Mexican Revolution (the Revolution)
began in 1910. See generally Roger Parkinson, Zapata: A Biography (1975).
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election null and void and called for open, armed rebellion.' In the
chaos that followed, several armies arose; among them was one led by
Emiliano Zapata,2 who fought "so that the people will have lands,
forests and water."3
The previous fifty years had witnessed the virtual obliteration
of communal ownership of rural land.4 Indigenous villages lost their
land to speculators in transfers made possible by several laws designed
to promote the use of agricultural land.5 The simmering resentment
of indigenous campesinos6 exploded in the armed struggle touched off
by the reelection controversy.7 The revolutionary war raged on for
nearly seven years until a new constitution was enacted in 1917.8
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917,9 the
cornerstone of land tenure law in Mexico, outlined the agrarian reform
demanded by the peasant armies of the Revolution. Article 27 declared
all land, water, and mineral rights to be the property of the people of
Mexico.' ° It also gave the government a mandate and the requisite
authority to expropriate land from large landholders and to give it to
1. More precisely, Madero's Plan de San Luis Potosi called for the revolution to
begin on Sunday, November 10, 1910 at 6:00 p.m. Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico: The
Struggle for Modernity 243 (1968); Michael C. Meyer & William L. Sherman, The Course
of Mexican History 495, 498-500 (1991); Ram6n E. Ruiz, Triumphs and Tragedy: A
History of the Mexican People 315 (1992).
2. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 244; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 506-08;
Ruiz, supra note 1, at 316-17.
3. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 317 (quoting Zapata's Plan de Ayala, in which Zapata
rejected Madero for his failure to support land reform). For the complete Spanish text
of the Plan de Ayala, see Manuel Fabila, Cinco Siglos de Legislaci6n Agraria en Mdxico
1493-1940, at 214-17 (1941).
4. See infra part II.D.
5. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
6. Spanish for "peasant(s), countrym(e)n; farmer(s)." Carlos Castillo & Otto F.
Bond, The University of Chicago Spanish Dictionary 75 (1987).
7. As Diaz left the country after having resigned, he was quoted as saying,
"Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us see if he can control him." Cumberland, supra note
1, at 241.
8. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 338.
9. Const. art. 27 (Mex.), translated in 12 Constitutions of the Countries of the
World, Mexico, at 23-32 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1988) [hereinafter
12 Constitutions].
10. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution states that "[o]wnership of the lands
and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the
Nation, which has had, and has the right to transfer title thereof to private persons,
thereby constituting private property." Const. art. 27, para. 1 (Mex.), translated in 12
Constitutions, supra note 9, at 23.
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eligible agrarian communities." Over the next sixty years,
administrations sporadically redistributed land of varying quality. 2
By 1988, more than three million households lived in over 28,000 rural
communes called ejidos.'3
From 1940 to 1965, Mexico experienced a "rapid and sustained
growth"1 4 in food production. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the
expansion of the agricultural sector slowed drastically 5 and could not
keep pace with Mexico's population growth. 6 Mexico began to import
an increasingly large amount of grains and beans. 7 Because subsidies
that were given to growers to convert to these badly needed staples
failed to remedy the situation, 8 Mexican governmental officials began
to criticize Mexico's progressive system of land tenure as preventing
11.
The Nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private
property such limitations as the public interest may demand as well
as the right to regulate the development of natural resources, which
are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and
equitably to distribute the public wealth. For this purpose necessary
measures shall be taken to divide large landed estates; to develop
small landed holdings; to establish new centers of population with
such lands and waters as may be indispensable to them; to encourage
agriculture and to prevent the destruction of natural resources, and
to protect property from damage detrimental to society. Settlements,
hamlets situated on private property and communes which lack land
or water or do not possess them in sufficient quantities for their
needs shall have the right to be provided with them from the
adjoining properties, always having due regard for small
landholdings. Wherefore all grants of lands made up to the present
time under the decree of January 6, 1915, are confirmed. Private
property acquired for the said purposes shall be considered as taken
for public utility.
Const. art. 27, para. 3 (1917) (amended 1992) (Mex.), reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3,
at 307-08.
12. Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico: 1910-1980, at 71-105
(1984).
13. John R. Heath, Evaluating the Impact of Mexico's Land Reform on Agricultural
Productivity, 20 World Dev. 695 (1992). Ejidal lands comprise "roughly one-third of
national territory and two-thirds of the nation's cropland . . . ." Id.
14. Id.
15. John R. Heath,An Overview of the Mexican Agricultural Crisis, in The Mexican
Economy 129 (George Phillip ed., 1988).
16. Id. at 131.
17. Sanderson, supra note 12, at 117.
18. Heath, supra note 13, at 696.
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agriculture's stable and efficient growth.19 Reverence for the ejido
system's contribution to economic growth and social stability in the
postwar era rapidly gave way to plans to dismantle it through
privatization.
On November 7, 1991, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
formally proposed to Mexico's federal legislature that Article 27's
guarantees of land for landless rural communities, as well as its
prohibitions on the ownership of rural land by corporations, be
deleted. ° More importantly, under the proposal members of ejidos,
called ejidatarios, would be able to mortgage, rent, or sell their
individual plots. 21  Both houses of the federal legislature
overwhelmingly approved the President's proposal.22  These
constitutional revisions not only ended redistribution of land to the
ejidos but also paved the way for mass transfer of rural land from
indigenous communities to multinational food corporations.23
This redistribution occasioned by the Salinas counter-reform
will have serious consequences both for Mexico's Indians24 as
individuals and for the integrity of their cultural traditions. Those
Indians who give away their land rights or have them taken from them
will flock to the already overburdened inner cities of the United States
and Mexico. The villagers they leave behind will see the ejidal lands
for which their ancestors fought and died broken up and handed over
to outsiders. The opening of a speculative market in ejidal land will
contribute to the breakdown of Mexico's indigenous traditions.
On January 1, 1994, a group of armed Indian peasants, calling
themselves the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (the
19. Id.
20. Jane Bussey, Mexico Turns Its Back on Agrarian Reform; 'Land to the Tiller'
is Still an Issue in the 81-Yr. Old Revolution, Writes Jane Bussey in Nueva Italia, The
Independent, Nov. 14, 1991, at 6; Damian Fraser, Mexico Launches Agricultural
Revolution, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 12, 1991, § 1, at 34; Marjorie Miller & Juanita
Darling, Mexico Seeks Land Reform, Bigger Farms, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al.
21. Bussey, supra note 20, at 6; Miller & Darling, supra note 20, at Al.
22. Mexican Lawmakers Pass Controversial Land Reform Bill, Reuters, Dec. 7,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File; Mexico Passes Controversial Land
Reform Bill, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 8, 1991, at 6; Marjorie Miller, Changing
Lifestyles; Confusion, Fear on Mexican Land. The Government Says It Has a Land
Reform Plan, But Farmers Are Again Skeptical, L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 1991, at 6.
23. For discussion of consequences of the constitutional changes, see infra part
III.D.
24. The Spanish word for the indigenous inhabitants of Mexico is indios. I will use
the English equivalent, "Indians," to refer to them and their culture.
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Zapatistas), rang in the new year by seizing control of several towns
in Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico.2 5 Their struggle has
brought international attention to the Mexican campesinos' quest for
land justice.
This Note will argue that the ejido is the past, present, and
future of the Mexican indigenous control of the land. Article 27 and the
agrarian reform program that followed from it revived an indigenous
system of land tenure that had survived the four centuries following
the arrival of the Spaniards in 1519.6 The Salinas administration's
1992 counter-reform opens up a speculative market in agricultural
land that threatens to destroy the communal way of life of Mexico's
Indians." By restricting commerce in land to ejidatarios only, the
Mexican government could allow market forces within the ejido to
foster productivity while preserving the integrity of the indigenous
culture.2"
Parts II, III, and IV of this Note will attempt to develop the
three aforementioned assertions about the past, present and future of
the ejido. Part II will trace the survival of communal indigenous land
tenure and its rebirth through the agrarian reform established under
Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. Part III will analyze the 1992
amendments to Article 27 and their likely impact on communal
indigenous land tenure. Part IV will discuss the benefits of a restricted
market in land and the window of opportunity opened by the Zapatista
uprising.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EJIDO
A. Introduction
Three major conflicts punctuate Mexican history: the Spanish
Conquest of 15 19,29 the War for Independence in 1810,3° and the
25. Tim Golden, Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57, N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1994, at Al.
26. See infra part II.
27. See infra part III.
28. See infra part IV.
29. See generally Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 95-130. Herndn Cortds led
the Spanish forces of conquest and became the first military governor. Id. See generally
Richard Lee Marks, Cortes (1993).
30. See generally Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 285-89.
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Mexican Revolution.3 Each event had a significant, if not immediate,
impact on indigenous land tenure.3 2 At the time of the Conquest, an
Aztec-controlled feudal structure dominated Mexico.33 With the defeat
of the Aztecs by Cort6s, some Indian lands came under the direct
control of the conquerors, while others remained essentially as they
were before the Conquest - paying the Spanish crown the tribute they
had been giving the Aztec Emperor. 34 The communal nature of the
land tenure of the surviving Indians35 remained undisturbed until the
Constitution of 1857 required that all communal lands be divided into
plots under private ownership.3 6 The next fifty years witnessed a
huge loss in the amount of lands owned by Indians, thus laying the
foundation for Revolution.38
B. Aztec Land Tenure
Although nomadic Indian tribes roamed the north of Mexico
39
and remnants of the Mayan civilization survived in the south,4 ° the
Aztecs controlled the greater part of Mexico at the time of Cortes'
arrival. The Aztecs established a feudal system of land tenure.4
31. See id. at 483-569; see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
32. See infra parts II.B-E.
33. See infra part II.B.
34. See infra part II.C.
35. More than half of the Indians living in Mexico at the time of Cortes' arrival
died in the first century of the Colonial period. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 77.
36. See infra part II.D.
37. See infra part II.D.
38. See infra part II.E.
39. The nomadic tribes of the largely arid north lacked any form of structured
agrarianism. George M. McBride, The Land Systems of Mexico 11 (1923).
40. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Mayan culture of the Yucatan
Peninsula and Chiapas was only a shadow of the great civilization that had dominated
that area. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 43-50. The Mayan system of land tenure
was completely devoid of the notion of private property. The precariousness of climactic
conditions in the Yucatan required the Mayans to move from area to area and prohibited
the formation of long-term individual or even small group ownership of land. Lucio
Mendieta y Nufiez, El Derecho Precolonial 48 (1937).
41. The Aztec agrarian system set up six different classes of Aztec land tenure: the
tlatlocalli, the pillalli, the mitlchimalli, the teotlapan, the capullalli, and the atlepetlalli.
The tlatlocalli and pillalli were the names given to the land set aside for the support of
the emperor and his nobility, respectively. These high level aristocrats did not work
these lands themselves. Instead, citizen-farmers called macechuales would fulfill their
obligations by periodically working these lands as tribute to their superiors. The
mitlchimalli and teotlapan were rented out to sharecroppers to benefit the army and the
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Peasant farmers called macechuales lived in districts that were
originally formed along blood lines and thus still bore the Aztec name
for kinship groups - capulli.42 Each capulli had its own agricultural
property called a capullalli. Although this land belonged to the
community as a whole, the rights to farm the land and keep its crops
were individually allotted to the various families." Families could not
sell these rights.4 5 Indeed, the right to farm the land personally was
also a duty: if a particular household did not fulfill it in any given two-
year period, the elders of the community would award the plot to
another newly formed family.46
Aztec feudalism emphasized social order over individual
initiative. One's class determined one's relationship to the land. One
could not buy another's land, although certain types of land could be
rented. This made for a very stable system in which market forces
were not permitted to maximize the use of land. The capulli tackled
the problem of idle lands by redistributing unused plots to those within
the capulli who would work them. The legacy of Aztec land tenure
endured at this basic level even after Cortes' arrival.
C. The Colonial Era, Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries
In the colonial era, the conflict between the Spanish throne
and its own conquistadors resulted in laws that revealed the tension
between social order and individual enterprise. In the West Indies, the
Spanish crown had rewarded its military explorers with encomiendas,
or plantation franchises. This system, which included the forced labor
of the inhabitants, had contributed to the decimation of the indigenous
population in the area.47 King Charles I gave Cortes orders not to
introduce the destructive franchise system onto the mainland. Cortes,
however, frustrated in his search for Aztec gold, granted his
lieutenants, as well as himself, vast encomiendas from which the crown
temples of the various gods, respectively. The capullalli were the macechuales' parcels.
See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. The atlepetlalli were lands that belonged
to the capulli as a whole and were not parcelled out. Mendieta y Nufiez, supra note 40,
at 42-46.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 46.
44, Id.; Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution 3 (1929).
45. Tannenbaum, supra note 44, at 3.
46. Mendieta y Nufiez, supra note 40, at 45; Tannenbaum, supra note 44, at 3.
47. McBride, supra note 39, at 44; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 131-32.
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received only a fourth of the tribute. 8 The encomienda grant
extinguished all communal Indian property rights within the district
granted to the encomendero. The King fought the spread of the
encomienda by giving legal protection to the remaining communal
lands.4 9
Many Indian villages remained outside the encomienda system.
These were directly subject to the Spanish crown. ° Early in the
sixteenth century, royal administrative bodies in Madrid enacted laws
to regulate the lives of the King's new subjects. This legislation
recognized the Indians' rights to communal lands.5 In addition to a
town site called a fundo legal, each town was to have an ejido. 2 The
laws not only gave royal sanction to the indigenous practices in
existing Indian villages, but also provided for their continued spread
by allowing Indians to form new villages, or pueblos, by gathering a
minimum number of persons in an unoccupied rural area.5 3
Although legal recognition of encomiendas threatened to
destroy all communal property rights, royal laws preserved the
legitimacy of indigenous control over the capullalli. The colonial
struggle between capulli and encomienda became the nineteenth
century conflict between the Indian pueblo and the hacienda.54 Legal
support for the pueblo continued until the middle of the nineteenth
century, when the privatization schemes of the Liberal Reform55 (the
Reform) set in motion the great decline of indigenous land tenure.
48. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 66-67. This was not, however, the end of the
struggle. See Ruiz, supra note 1, at 54-62; see also infra notes 52-56 and accompanying
text.
49. McBride, supra note 39, at 123-27; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 64.
50. McBride, supra note 39, at 123; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 64-65.
51. Fabila, supra note 3, at 16-19; McBride, supra note 39, at 123; Ruiz, supra note
1, at 64.
52. McBride, supra note 39, at 124. "The ejido included within its bounds the
agricultural plots of the inhabitants, the common wood lots, and the pasture land for the
cattle of the village. These were all inalienable and were to be administered by the town
council." Id.
53. Id. at 126-27.
54. Id.
55. The Reform was the period of creole bourgeois ascendancy in Mexican history.
See generally, Ruiz, supra note 1, at 220-41. It should not be confused with the Article
27 land reform instituted after the Mexican Revolution.
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D. The Republic and the Porfiriato of the Nineteenth Century
Although Mexico's War of Independence in 1810 expressed
indigenous peoples' desires for agrarian justice, 6 there was very little
immediate change in Mexico's land tenure system. 7 In the 1850s,
Liberals led by Benito Judsrez ushered in the historical period known
as the Reform. While Mexicans consider the Reform as the birth of
democracy in their country, it was a disastrous period for Indian
pueblos .
The Ley Lerdo or Law of June 25, 1856,' 9 attempted to build
an agrarian middle class. The law gave individuals who worked plots
held by the Church or by Indian communities a three-month period in
which to purchase their plots." The purchase price was calculated by
adding a hefty transaction tax to the rent regularly paid. After three
months elapsed, third parties could purchase the land for a premium
of one-eighth of the set price.6 ' Although the law specifically
exempted ejidos, it was superseded by the Constitution of 1857, which
contained no such exemption in its call for the privatization of
communal lands.62
In the midst of a five-year war against French invaders,"
Judrez, desperate for cash, authorized the sale of "vacant" national
lands that the Republic had inherited from the Spanish crown.'
Many Indian communities had settled and farmed these lands with
and without title.65 Before the crisis was over, more than four and a
half million acres of communal lands had passed into private hands.66
56. The War for Independence was sparked by El Grito, the speech of a rebellious
Mexican priest named Miguel Hidalgo. In addressing his indigenous parishioners, the
priest enjoined them "to recover the lands stolen three hundred years ago from your
forefathers by the hated Spaniards." Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 287.
57. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 113-30; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 157; Tannenbaum,
supra note 44, at 8.
58. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 165-66; McBride, supra note 39, at 129.
59. Ley de 25 de junio de 1856, art. 11, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3, at 109-
15.
60. Ley de 25 de junio de 1856, art. 9, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3, at 111.
61. Ley de 25 de junio de 1856, art. 11, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3, at 111.
62. McBride, supra note 39, at 130; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 232.
63. This period of French domination, known as the Intervention, took place from
1861 to 1867. See generally Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 387-401.
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The election of Porfirio Diaz in 1876 brought four decades of
relative stability known as the Porfiriato, named after the man who
would not leave office.67 Despite the absence of armed conflict, the
process of Indian dispossession accelerated.68 In 1883, the government
authorized the survey of the rest of the "vacant" national lands and
offered one-third of the land to the surveyors as compensation for their
efforts. 9 Immediately, these compafitas deslindadoras went about the
countryside denouncing indigenous title to national lands.7 ° Much of
the communal land had already found its way into the estates of large
landowners by 1870. The legally sanctioned, coercive expropriation of
indigenous land aggravated a festering bitterness among rural Indians.
This resentment later exploded when Diaz was forced to leave office in
1910.71 The lawmakers, by their attempts to spur development and
encourage investment, had ignored for too long the social resentment
building in the countryside. Revolution would bring a total reworking
of Mexican agrarian land tenure law.
E. Revolutionary Mexico, 1910-1917
The goals of the Mexican Revolution quickly moved from
effective suffrage to land justice. The eruption of the Revolution in the
countryside indicated that no person or coalition would hold office long
without addressing the need for land.72 Venustiano Carranza emerged
from six years of chaos as. the leading political figure.73 His
presidential decree of January 6, 1915, outlined the mechanisms by
which large landed estates would be dismantled and returned to the
villages.74 This decree became the basis for Article 27," the longest
and most important article of the revolutionary Constitution of 1917.
Article 27 began by declaring that: "The ownership of the lands and
waters comprised within the limits of the national territory is vested
67. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
68. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 198-204.
69. Ley de Terrenos Baldios, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3, at 183-189.
70. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 199-200.
71. Id. at 243; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 307-09.
72. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 241-47; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 544.
73. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 244; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 545-50.
74. Guillermo Floris Margadant S., An Introduction to the History of Mexican Law
268 (1983); Tannenbaum, supra note 44, at 171; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 333-34.
75. Margadant S., supra note 74, at 268; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 336; Tannenbaum,
supra note 44, at 171.
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originally in the Nation, which has had, and has the right to transmit
thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property."7"
After describing the source and limits of private property,
Article 27 limited the ability of foreigners, churches, charities,
corporations, and banks to own land.7 v Status, not contract, was the
foundation of land tenure in revolutionary Mexico.
Article 27 also provided for the sources and methods of land
redistribution." In addition to reasserting the government's right to
take back title to land (with indemnification to its former owner) at
any time in the public interest, it outlined a program of land reform.79
All transfers of indigenous property made under Judrez's Ley Lerdo
were declared void; only those owners who had held less than fifty
hectares"0 for more than ten years were to be exempt from this
restitutionary provision.8 ' In addition to restoring land to indigenous
communities that could establish their recent loss of it, Article 27
provided for the expropriation of large private holdings in order to
supply the remaining landless pueblos with the land they required. 2
In 1917, a year remembered much more for the beginning of
the Marxist revolution in St. Petersburg than the culmination of the
indigenous one in Quer~taro,' the Mexican Constitutional Congress
76. Coast. art. 27, para. 1 (1917) (amended 1992) (Mex.), translated in
Tannenbaum, supra note 44, app. at 518.
77. Section I differentiated between two groups of people - Mexicans and
foreigners. The latter came to own substantial land and mineral rights under Porfirio
Diaz. With the adoption of Article 27, however, only the former had a constitutional right
to acquire land. Foreigners now had to receive clearance from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and under no circumstances could they own territory "Iwlithin a zone of 100
kilometers from the frontiers and of 50 kilometers from the sea coast." Section II forbade
religious institutions from acquiring, holding, or administering any real property or even
a security interest therein. Section III limited the ability of secular, non-profit
organizations to take mortgages on land as security for loans they might make. Section
IV put rural properties beyond the reach of commercial stock companies. Section V
limited the quantity and term of the land tenure of banks to "that absolutely necessary
for their direct purposes." Const. art. 27, §§ I-V (1917) (amended 1992) (Mex.), translated
in Tannenbaum, supra note 44, app. at 520-23.
78. Const. art. 27, § VII (1917) (amended 1937) (Mex.), reprinted in Fabila, supra
note 3, at 309-11.
79. Id.
80. One hectare, 10,000 square meters, is approximately 2.47 acres.
81. Const. art. 27, § VII (1917) (amended 1937) (Mex.), reprinted in Fabila, supra
note 3, at 307-11.
82. Id.
83. Quer6taro was the site of the Mexican Constitutional Congress in 1917.
Cumberland, supra note 1, at 259, 271.
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outlined a system of tenure based more on feudalist legal traditions
than on either capitalist or communist notions of property. Zapata's
army of Indian campesinos had inspired the drafters of Article 27 to
reclaim Mexico's indigenous heritage as they outlined the future of the
Mexican countryside.84
F. The Rise of the Ejido Structure, 1917-1940
As powerful as the demands for social justice that propelled the
passage of Article 27 were, land reform languished under the early
presidents of revolutionary Mexico."5 The golden era of land
distribution began with the inauguration of Lizaro Cdrdenas in
1934.' In the pre-Cdrdenas era, advocates of free investment
persuaded administrations to give what little land they expropriated
to private farmers. With Cdrdenas came not only the rapid
acceleration of land redistribution,8 but also an emphasis on
collective holdings reflected in changes to Article 27 itself. The
resulting legal framework of the ejido bore a striking resemblance to
that of the Aztec capullalli.
Although the ejido became the embodiment of Mexico's
agrarian reform program, original Article 27 anticipated the division
of indigenous communal lands into individual, even alienable,
parcels.8 9 Revolutionary presidents preceding Cdrdenas did not differ
84. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 507.
85. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 296-98; John M. Hart, The Agrarian Reform, in
Twentieth Century Mexico 11-13 (W. Dirk Raat & William H. Beezley eds., 1986); Meyer
& Sherman, supra note 1, at 576, 592; Ruiz, supra note 1, at 356-59. Zapata, unsatisfied
by the results of the land reform program, continued to wage war on the government;
Carranza's followers had him assassinated in 1919. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 341.
86. Cumberland, supra note 1, at 298-99; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 598-
600.
87. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 357-59.
88. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 1, at 600-02.
89.
Properties held in common by co-owners, hamlets situated on private
property, pueblos, tribal congregations and other settlements which,
as a matter of fact or law, conserve their communal character, shall
have legal capacity to enjoy in common the waters, woods and lands
belonging to them, or which shall be restored to them according to
the law of January 6, 1915, until such time as the manner of making
the division of the lands shall be determined by law.
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greatly from the reformers of the nineteenth century in that they, too,
favored the small private farm over any collective form of
ownership.9 The Cdrdenas administration, however, not only rapidly
accelerated the pace of land redistribution, but also made bold changes
to the agrarian regulations and to Article 27 that reasserted the
communal nature of indigenous land ownership.
In 1937, the relevant section of Article 27 was amended. Unlike
the earlier provision, the new provision dealing with the status of
restored lands did not anticipate dividing the communal lands into
individual pieces of private property.9' The agrarian regulations
adopted during the C~rdenas period reflected this renewed
commitment to communal ownership.
Although the federal legislature enacted several laws
pertaining to agrarian reform in its first two decades,92 the first
complete Agrarian Code was not promulgated until 1934.9' It
provided for complete inalienability of ejidal lands.' This prohibition
applied to both the rental and sale of ejidal land.9 5 The Code, reviving
the law of the Aztecs, prescribed forfeiture of plots as the penalty for
persons who did not personally work them for two consecutive
years.' Federal agrarian laws enacted pursuant to Article 27 also
effectively forbade the use of ejido parcels as collateral for
mortgages.97
The adoption of restrictions on the alienation of ejidal lands
brought the history of Mexican agricultural law full circle. The Aztecs
had formally proscribed all transfers of the commoners' farm plots.9"
Const. art. 27, § VI (1917) (amended 1937) (Mex.), translated in Tannenbaum, supra note
44, app. at 523 (emphasis added).
90. See supra part I.D. and note 87.
91. "The centers of population which, by law or in fact, possess a communal status
shall have legal capacity to enjoy common possession of the lands, forests, and waters
belonging to them or which have been or may be restored to them." Const. art. 27, § VII
(1937) (amended 1992) (Mex.), translated in 12 Constitutions, supra note 9, at 27.
92. C6digo Agrario, D.O., July 3, 1934, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3, at 566-
614.
93. Lucio Mendieta y Nufiez, El Problema Agrario de M6xico 245 (1982).
94. C6digo Agrario arts. 117, 140, D.O., July 3, 1934, reprinted in Fabila, supra
note 3, at 593-94.
95. Id.
96. C6digo Agrario art. 144, D.O., July 3, 1934, reprinted in Fabila, supra note 3,
at 603. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
97. Sanderson, supra note 12, at 110.
98. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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While the twentieth century Mexican agrarian reform still provided for
the existence of small, private farms, which could be transferred freely,
Article 27 and the Agrarian Code protected the ejido from the theft
and speculation that had plagued them in the four hundred years since
the Spanish Conquest.
III. THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THE SALINAS SOLUTION
A. The Perceived Failure of the Ejido, 1940-1992
Mexico saw a sustained growth in its agricultural output from
1940 to 1 9 6 5 .99 The expansion did not last, however, and by the mid-
1970s, Mexico was importing a great deal of its food. 0 Government
economists, looking for explanations, blamed the restrictions on the
transfer of ejido lands. The prohibition on mortgaging land did make
obtaining private financing virtually impossible. As a result, ejidatarios
were very dependent on the government for credit. Obstacles other
than the transfer restrictions also made development of the ejido
difficult. Because they lacked certificates of title, ejido farmers had to
work lands under the cloud of possible dispossession. Both insecurity
of title and lack of access to credit held back the ejido.
1. Ejidatarios' Access to Credit
Ejido farmers found it extremely difficult to obtain private
financing.'0 ' Since ejido parcels could not be transferred,' 2 private
lenders could not look to the land as security for loans. Formalistic
interpretations of the Agrarian Code's restrictions on the alienation of
land had prohibited farmers from using their own future harvests as
collateral for loans.'0 3 What little credit there was went to the
purchase of seed;' hence, important tools and machinery were
generally unavailable to the average ejidatario.
99. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
101. Sanderson, supra note 12, at 110-11.
102. See supra part II.F.
103. Since the harvest was to come from the land, it was deemed part of the land
and thus subject to the same restrictions. Kenneth L. Karst & Norris C. Clement, Legal
Institutions and Development: Lessons from the Mexican Ejido, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 281, 291
(1969).
104. Sanderson, supra note 12, at 110-11.
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Public sector lending proved inadequate to fill the tremendous
need for development capital.105 Most of those peasants fortunate
enough to receive government loans already had larger, irrigated
farms.0 6 Over the years, ejidos lost control over decisions about what
to plant as the ejidal credit system became an instrument of the ever
changing, national food policy.
10 7
2. Ejidatarios' Lack of Security of Tenure
Many ejido members faced the possibility of losing their land
throughout the entirety of the reform period.' The overwhelming
majority of ejidatarios worked lands they knew to be theirs but lacked
the certificates of title to prove it. 9 Typical bureaucratic inefficiency
explains part of the delay, but much of the dearth of documentation
was by design. By denying Indian farmers title to their lands, local
political bosses fostered a sense of dependency among the ejidatarios
that became valuable at election time."0 Corruption within the
ejido' l l also caused uncertainty among ejidatarios as to whether the
105. Id. at 110-16.
106. Id. at 115.
107. Id. at 116.
108. Karst & Clement, supra note 103, at 293-97.
109.
In about 10 percent of the ejidos, there has never been a final
decision by the national government granting the land to the ejido.
And of the 90 percent that do have a final grant of land to the
community, only about 5 percent have had a distribution to their
individual members of what are called 'titles."
Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
110. "The political utility of this insecurity is easy to see. The ejidatarios were kept
dependent on the agencies of the government, and that dependency was readily
converted into political support." Id. at 297.
111.
In El Bajo [an ejidol, this uncertainty of tenure rights has in fact
been exploited by a dishonest ejido leadership group, which sought
to oust some ejidatarios from the parcels they had been working, and
to replace them with the leaders' friends. In 1966, after the harvest,
the president of the ejido . . . held a ceremony in his home. In
exchange for some cartons of beer, he purported to transfer the rights
to work several parcels of land. When the victims complained, an
official of the Agrarian Department telephoned the President,
informed him that his actions were illegal, and told him to return the
parcels of land to their former occupants. Since the regular ejido
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work they put into a parcel of land in any given year would end up
benefitting someone else the following season.
1 12
In addition to corruption inside and outside the ejido, many
ejidatarios feared legal dispossession of their land because their own
violations of the agrarian law had exposed them to its selective
enforcement. Ejidatarios often lacked the economic and human
resources to cultivate and harvest their plots; therefore, many would
rent their parcels out to other ejidatarios"1 ' or hire others to help
them work the land."' Although the law prescribed forfeiture as the
penalty for such offenses,"' loss of land was by no means
automatic."6 Nevertheless, by operating outside the letter of the law,
ejidatarios could not develop lands without fearing for the security of
their title.
Despite their dependence on governmental authorities for
credit and security of ownership, ejidatarios proved themselves to be
just as productive as small, private farmers. 1 7 Nevertheless, overly
broad restraints on alienation, combined with local political oppression,
prevented the ejido from contributing more to Mexico's food production
system. As that system's crisis worsened in the 1970s and 1980s,"8
the need for change in Mexico's agricultural policies became more
apparent.
B. The Proposed Solutions
Since President Salinas took office in 1988, most public and
political attention to the rural sector has focused on possible structural
changes in the system of agrarian reform." 9 Salinas wrote his
elections were to be held within a month, no punishment was visited
on the president ....
Id. at 294.
112. Id. at 297.
113. Jesds C. Morrett S., Alternativas de Modernizaci6n del Ejido 81-88 (1992).
114. Id. at 80-81.
115. Karst & Clement, supra note 103, at 295 n.52.
116. Id. at 295.
117. Heath, supra note 13, at 700-02; Heath, supra note 15, at 149.
118. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
119. See Morett S., supra note 113; see also Legislaci6n y Modernizaci6n Rural
(Rosa Isabel Estrada Martinez ed., 1990).
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Harvard doctoral dissertation on the subject 20 and has made the
modernization of the rural sector the focus of his political agenda in
much the same way that President Clinton has put the spotlight on
the health care system in the United States. The increased attention
has provoked a lively exchange of proposals ranging from renewed
support for the ejido to the complete elimination of all forms of
communal ownership. 2 '
While some private sector advocates have called for the
complete privatization of the ejido,'22 others have realized the central
place that the ejido occupies in Mexico's collective historical
consciousness and have proposed more moderate changes. 2 ' Under
one such plan,'24 private persons, businesses, and ejido members
would come together to form Associations of Agroindustrial
Participation.1 25 These new entities would arrange with the
ejidatarios to rent the land for periods of up to thirty years.126 In
addition to financing operations, investors would have the obligation
to ensure that the ejidatarios' remuneration amounted to the
equivalent of Mexico's minimum wage.
27
Campesino organizations have rejected this proposal because
it would overturn one of the greatest achievements of the Revolution
- peasant control of the land.'28 One of these groups, the National
Union of Regional Autonomous Campesino Organizations,' 29 has
called for increased public attention and support for the ejido,3 ° and
120. All Things Considered: Mexican Farm Co-ops to be Privatized (NPR radio
broadcast, Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
121. Rosa Isabel Estrada Martinez, La Politica Moderna de Desamortizacidn
Rural, in Legislaci6n y Modernizaci6n Rural, supra note 119, at 76-79; Morett S., supra
note 113, at 127-38.
122. Morett S., supra note 113, at 129.
123. Id.
124. The proponents of the plan at first attempted to remain anonymous but were
soon discovered to be economists within the Salinas administration. Estrada Martinez,
supra note 121, at 77.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Mexico's minimum wage amounts to $4.20 a day. Damian Fraser, No Such
Thing as a Free Treaty: NAFTA Will Not Solve the Deep-Seated Structural Problems
Facing the Mexican Economy, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 11, 1993, at 19.
128. Id.
129. Its proposal is outlined in Luis Meneses Murillo & B6irbara Zamora L6pez,
Legislaci6n y Modernizaci6n Rural, in Legislaci6n y Modernizaci6n Rural, supra note
119, at 15-25.
130. Id. at 16.
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an end to judicial recourse for persons whose lands have been selected
for redistribution. 3 ' Another group, the National Campesino
Confederation, 3 2 has stressed the importance of increased autonomy
for the ejidos as to what they should grow and how they should grow
it.' 33 Neither group, however, has favored any major step toward
privatization.'34
Academic experts in agricultural affairs have offered options
that lie between the two extremes. One commentator has called for the
creation of an agrarian patrimony 35 of twenty hectares.'36 An
ejidatario would be free to put a certain amount of his land at risk for
investment purposes, but the twenty hectares encompassed by the
patrimonial provision would be immune from attachment or
transfer. 13 Another more moderate solution would allow ejidos to
collectively choose either to remain under some slightly modified form
of ejidal regulation or to move towards privatization. 
3 8
Although the various proposals address a number of concerns,
including public sector support for the ejido and the domination of
ejidatarios by local political figures,' 39 the controversy has centered
on the restrictions placed on the transferability of ejido land.
Therefore, before evaluating the different approaches to this complex
issue, this Note will examine the advantages and disadvantages of
alienation restrictions in general. Setting out a theoretical framework
will facilitate a critique of the actual changes made in 1992, and the
consideration of corrections.
131. Id. at 20.
132. The National Campesino Confederation (CNC) was formed during the
Crdenas administration and is now the rural branch of the Revolutionary Institutional
Party, the dominant political party in Mexico. Ruiz, supra note 1, at 397, 423. Since the
1940s, the CNC has opposed the party line to defend only the most urgent of campesino
concerns. Gustavo Esteva, The Struggle for Rural Mexico 89-90 (1983).
133. Estrada Martinez, supra note 121, at 76.
134. See id. at 78-79 (contrasting the two groups' proposals with other proposals
calling for varying degrees of private ownership).
135. Morett S., supra note 113, at 137.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988) (providing for the exemption of certain assets from
creditors' claims in bankruptcy proceedings). See Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of
Bankruptcy 47-49 (1992).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 146-47. This is the view that the author supports as the most viable.
139. See supra part III.A.
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C. Theoretical Framework
In the United States, Law and Economics scholars have
debated the advantages and disadvantages of restraints on
alienation. 4 o Although debates over specific instances of
transferability restrictions have tended to deal with contemporary
controversies such as residential rent control, 4 ' the sale of body
parts,142 and paid adoptions, 143 one author, Robert Ellickson, has
recently published an article evaluating the desirability of restrictions
on the transfer of agricultural land. In Property in Land,'" Ellickson
examines several advantages and disadvantages of an unfettered
speculative market in agricultural land. 4 5
Ellickson begins with a list of three advantages of free
commerce in land. First, the uninhibited sale of agricultural property
would tend to redistribute land to those who could make the most
140. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liabilty
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1111-15
(1972); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970 (1985);
Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931
(1985).
141. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to
Professor Epstein, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1239 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and
the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 741 (1989); Margaret Jane Radin,
Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 350 (1986).
142. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Economics and Ethics of
Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 403 (1991); Lloyd
R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market,
58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
143. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the
Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1987); J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for
Babies?, 34 U. Toronto L.J. 341, 347-57 (1984).
144. Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315 (1992).
145. Id. at 1375-80. Ellickson's thesis, in this section, is primarily historical. He
argues that while cultures find wholesale bans useful in their primitive phase, as they
progress they turn toward the economic advantages of free commerce in land. The
twentieth century revival of Aztec alienation restraints in Mexico appears to contradict
this thesis. Ellickson responds that the widespread pattern of violations of the
prohibition against rental, see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text, demonstrates
"how doggedly members of a post-literate society are likely to resist imposition of
restraints on alienation." Ellickson, supra note 144, at 1380.
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profitable use of it.' 46 Second, the ability to sell land would provide
an incentive for owners without cherished heirs to take care of the
land."'7 Third, free transferability of land would be necessary if the
property is to serve as collateral for a loan.14  Despite these
advantages, Ellickson recognizes the appropriateness, at least in "pre-
literate societies," of restraints on alienation.1
49
Ellickson acknowledges that an unrestrained market in land
would tend to break down communal ties.15 ' As new purchasers
replace long-time residents, social institutions, such as common
defense, which are based on kinship ties, would no longer be able to
function."' Close-knit societies would feel these externalities - that
is, the effects of a transaction upon persons not party to the
transaction - more severely.
Ellickson, however, neglects to mention two other sets of
arguments for restraining alienation, neither of which focuses
explicitly on externalities. The first group of arguments promotes the
prohibition of certain commercial transactions that harm one or more
of the parties themselves. The contract law principle of
unconscionability, 1 2 for instance, flows from such considerations.
Paternalistic justifications reject the notion that a given individual
always knows what is best for him or her."' The second group makes
146. "Blackstone concisely stated the basic rationale for consensual alienability of
land: '[lit was found that what became inconvenient or useless to one man was highly
convenient and useful to another .... Thus mutual convenience introduced commercial
traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale .... . Id. at 1375 (quoting 2
William Blackstone, Commentaries *9).
147. This particular argument for alienability builds on an earlier argument for
perpetual title as a means of providing incentives to a landholder to take care of her
land. As the landholder reaches the end of her life, this motivation continues insofar as
she has loved ones to whom she can transfer the land upon her death. If she has no such
"bequest motive," as Ellickson calls it, she can still reap the long-term benefit of her care
of the land only if she is allowed to sell the land and convert it to cash which she can use
during her lifetime. Id. at 1368-71, 1375.
148. Id. at 1375.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1376, 1378.
151. Id. at 1376.
152. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1981). Karl Llewellyn, the drafter of article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, borrowed this concept from Native American notions of fair
dealing. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Cheyenne Way (1941).
153. But see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 140, at 1113 (arguing that certain
notions of paternalism are completely compatible with the maximization of individual
interests).
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no explicit reference to the consequences of the transaction. Instead,
this deontological critique rejects certain kinds of commerce because
they degrade that which is being sold."s
The legal literature provides an analysis of both the efficiency
considerations favoring free trade as well as the possible harms
occasioned by an unfettered market. Anyone formulating a policy on
the proper role, if any, of alienation restraints must weigh the
advantages of the market against its disadvantages. Inevitably, there
will be trade-offs. In restructuring the ejido, the Salinas administration
opted to eliminate many of the protective restrictions on the
alienability of ejidal land. In so doing, it has exposed indigenous
communities to the hazards of a speculative market in land.
D. Salinas' Counter-Reform: The 1992 Revisions to Article 27
The sweeping changes of Article 27 can be grouped into two
categories: first, the end of land redistribution to landless communities,
and, second, the opening of a market in agricultural land. The first set
of revisions consisted of the deletion of all sections promising and
regulating the future redistribution of agrarian land. 5  The second
involved the lifting of restrictions on both ejidatarios' ability to transfer
rural land and commercial entities' capacity to own it." 6 The first
group of changes formally ended a program of land redistribution that
154. These arguments are most frequently put forward in debates over the
propriety of a market in human body parts or the legalization of baby-selling. See supra
notes 142, 143.
155. Const. art. 27 §§ X-XIV, XVI (repealed 1992) (Mex.).
156. The Decree of January 3, 1992, reversed the longstanding prohibition of
ownership of rural lands by private, for-profit corporations. The new corporate
restrictions read:
Commercial stock companies may be owners of rural lands but only
to the extent necessary for their purpose. The regulatory law will
establish the limits of territorial property that corporations engaged
in agricultural, livestock and forestry activities will be allowed to
have, as well as the capital structure and the minimum number of
stockholders, and the extent that the corporation's property per
stockholder may be adjusted in relation to the limits of small
property ....
Const. art. 27 § IV (Mex.). For an analysis of the remaining restrictions on corporate land
ownership, see Adriana de Aguinaga, The New Agrarian Law - Mexico's Way Out, 24
St. Mary's L.J. 883, 890-93 (1993).
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had substantively ended with the departure of Cirdenas in 1940.157
The second set of amendments, on the other hand, made possible a
market in agricultural land that might ultimately destroy Indian
culture in Mexico.
Pursuant to this second category of 1992 amendments to
Article 27, ejidatarios are able to transfer their land in any one of
three ways. First, they can rent or even sell their land to other persons
in the ejido.55 Second, they can enter into joint venture agreements
with multinational food corporations. 5 ' Finally, they can offer the
rights to work their parcels as security for agricultural loans.6 0 Each
of these forms of transfer can be analyzed in terms of the theoretical
arguments advanced against unrestrained alienability: externalities,
paternalistic considerations and violations of dignity. While the first
set of transfers - those within the ejido community - substantially
avoid these criticisms, the second and third group of transactions
create serious problems by involving outsiders.
1. Voluntary Transfer to Other Ejidatarios
The current agrarian regulatory scheme imposes the fewest
restrictions on ejidatarios' ability to sell or rent to other residents of
the ejido. Like the two types of transfer that involve persons outside
the communities, sales between ejidatarios might offend those who
claim that land is too sacred to be traded for money.' 6' Since both
parties, however, would be members of the same indigenous
157. Morett S., supra note 113, at 27-31.
158. Const. art. 27, § VII (Mex.); Ley Agraria arts. 79, 80, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992
(Mex.).
159. Const. art. 27, § VII (Mex.); Ley Agraria arts. 125-33, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992
(Mex.).
160. Const. art. 27, § VII (Mex.); Ley Agraria art. 46, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992 (Mex.).
161.
The president in Washington sends word that he wishes to buy our
land. But how can you buy or sell the sky? The land? The idea is
strange to us. If we do not own the freshness of the air and the
sparkle of water, how can you buy them?
Paul S. Wilson, What Chief Seattle Said, 22 Envtl. L. 1451, 1458 n.36 (1992) (letter from
Chief Seattle, head of the Duwamish & Saquamish Indians of Puget Sound to President
Franklin Pierce (1855)) (No original letter has ever been located. Although other quotes
attributed to Chief Seattle actually originated decades after his death, this particular
passage is believed to be original.).
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community, it seems less likely that their behavior would be out of
step with community values than if one of them represented business
interests outside the community. Although ejidatarios do not need to
seek approval from the leaders of the ejido in order to rent their
parcels," 2 these community authorities would be involved in any sale
from one ejidatario to another'o and thus could obstruct the process
if it violated communal norms per se.
The possibility that the transferring ejidatario might be coerced
or tricked into an unconscionable transaction also seems more remote.
Since persons within the same ejido would tend to have comparable
financial resources and similar approaches to commercial affairs,
transfers among ejidatarios would not give rise to strong paternalistic
objections. Acknowledging that the possibility of oppression from
within the community still exists, the law, at both the statutory and
constitutional levels, limits the amount any one ejidatario can own to
five percent of the total land of the ejido.'"
In the same manner, transfers among ejidatarios would not
threaten the integrity of the community as would sales to outsiders. By
preserving the homogeneity of the community, a sale from one
ejidatario to another would allow the transferor to sell an otherwise
useless piece of land without breaking up the close social ties of the
community.
Thus, the first of the three groups of transactions allowed by
the 1992 revisions gives necessary flexibility to the ejido system
without sacrificing the basic stability and integrity of the community.
An intracommunal market can provide many of the economic benefits
that Ellickson associates with commerce in land.'65 Only when the
law opens that market to a vastly different commercial reality does the
indigenous culture of the ejido community necessarily suffer.
2. Voluntary Transfer to Joint Ventures
Proponents of the possibilities of ejidal development through
joint ventures with agribusiness point to the example of San Jos6 de
162. Ley Agraria art. 79, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992 (Mex.).
163. Ley Agraria art. 80, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992 (Mex.).
164. Const. art. 27, § VII (Mex.); Ley Agraria arts. 125-33, D.O., Feb. 26, 1992
(Mex.).
165. For a list of Ellickson's benefits, see supra notes 144-51 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the ability of an intracommunal land market to provide them,
see infra part IV.A.
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Vaqudrias. Vaqudrias was once an ejido wrestling with the same
problems of lack of credit for seed and machinery that other ejidos
faced. In 1990, however, Alberto Santos, the former head of Gamesa,
Mexico's largest cookie manufacturer, invested six million dollars in
Vaqu~rias.1 " Under a joint venture agreement, farmers who opted
in would grow wheat, beans, and sorghum, splitting the profits fifty-
fifty with the investor. The government, far from condemning the
arrangement as contrary to law, agreed to match the private
investment.1 6 Production rose seventy percent in the first year. The
sale of the first wheat crop earned Vaqu6rias more than a million
dollars, half of which went to the 340 ejidatarios who joined the
venture.16
While Vaqudrias seems to hold the promise of good times to
come, the realities of agrarian development show the vision to be
somewhat illusory. The government's matching subsidy was the key to
the success of the project. Critics of the reform have pointed out that
international food companies will court only those ejidos that have the
access to water, roads, and power necessary to turn a profit.169 Ejidos
with little to offer potential investors may be able to secure joint
venture agreements only by accepting considerably less attractive
terms. Such joint venture agreements would most likely be little more
than work agreements -in which the former owners would turn over
their rights to farm their parcels for the opportunity to receive the
minimum wage allowed by law.
These new ventures would resemble the haciendas of the pre-
Revolution period. Indians would live and work on land essentially
controlled by others. The vast gap - both in financial resources and
commercial sophistication - between the ejidatarios and the
representatives of agricultural investors would raise grave concerns
over the substantive justice of the resulting contracts. As part of such
arrangements, ejidatarios might, for instance, use chemical pesticides
previously unavailable to them; these noxious chemicals could have
grave consequences for ejidatarios who do not enter into the ventures,
as well as for those who do. Associations between ejidatarios and
agribusiness expose the former to dangers inherent in the encounter
166. Dudley Althaus, Mexico Woos Seed Money Back to Farm, Houston Chron.,
Nov. 24, 1991, (Business), at 1.
167. Id.
168. All Things Considered, supra note 120.
169. Id.
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between radically different cultures with radically different resource
levels.
3. Involuntary Transfer to Creditors
For each ejidatario who transfers his land voluntarily, many
more will lose their lands by defaulting on agricultural loans. Credit
is an absolute necessity in agricultural production; without it, farmers
cannot buy seed and other necessary production materials, or even
sustain themselves and their families until harvest. Before ejidal lands
became alienable, the penalties for default were slight.17 ° Although
an ejidatario could lose his land for violating some provision of
agrarian regulation, such as the prohibition against renting or hiring
labor, 7 ' he would never have lost it for failure to pay a debt. Now,
ejidatarios will get their loans at the risk of their lands. The resulting
forfeitures will have grave consequences for both the defaulting
ejidatarios and their neighbors.
Technically, under the new scheme, an ejidatario seeking
money for seed or tools could pledge the right to work his parcel as
security for a loan.'72 If he failed to repay the loan, the creditor
would be able to claim only the right to farm the property and sell its
crops. An Indian forced off his land would lose his vital link to the
community.7 3 Faced with the prospect of being essentially landless
for up to thirty years, a campesino in default would most likely
abandon his reversionary interest and move to the city.
The other members of the ejido community would also suffer
from the loss occasioned by the securitization of ejidal land use rights.
Even an ejido that lost only a relatively small amount of its land to
creditors could find its way of life disrupted and the integrity of its
indigenous institutions broken by the presence of outside commercial
170. Heath, supra note 117, at 700.
171. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173.
A plot of land or "milpa" has been described as an Indian's "symbol
of the right to live." For many Ch'ol, Tzeltal and Tzotzil Indians in
Chiapas, land ownership is a condition of "Indian-ness." Those
without usually leave their villages, severing ancestral ties, religious
customs and languages to begin the process of "mestizaje" -
Westernization.
Phillip Wearne, A Land that the Times Forgot, The Guardian, Jan. 7, 1994, at 15.
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interests. Villages once completely comprised of and controlled by a
people of common traditions and beliefs would become a checkerboard
of plots still owned by villagers and those controlled by banks.
In studying the likely consequences 17 4 of the legalization of
all three types of transactions - transfers among ejidatarios, joint
venture agreements with agribusiness, and mortgages to private
financiers - the critical issue that arises is not the ejidatarios' ability
to transfer land, but rather who should be allowed to take it from
them. Insofar as it allows enterprise within the ejido community, the
Salinas administration's counter-reform permits reasonable
adjustments among ejidatarios without creating serious threats to
indigenous culture or land tenure. By allowing private banks and
multinational food corporations to come into the ejidos to make
business arrangements with certain ejidatarios and compete with
others, however, the 1992 amendments open the door to
unconscionable arrangements that will ultimately result in the
dispossession and migration of Indians from the rural areas and the
subjugation of those who remain behind.
IV. INDIGENOUS LAND TENURE AFTER THE 1992 COUNTER-REFORM
A. A Sustainable Market in Ejido Land
While the financing schemes made possible by the 1992
counter-reform will destroy communal indigenous land tenure in favor
of agribusiness,17 5 a less drastic revision would make possible
alternative methods of capital infusion that would develop ejidos
without destroying their essential nature. For instance, ejidatarios who
take out loans using the subsequent harvest as collateral neither
endanger the long-term security of their landholdings nor threaten the
communal stability of the ejido. Even those transactions that involve
transfer or risk of transfer of actual land interests need not wreck the
lives and culture of ejidatarios. In order to prevent these disastrous
communal consequences, however, ejidal regulation must limit such
commerce to the ejido community itself. This restricted market in land
174. Although the changes in policy with regard to ejidal alienability are already
two years old, their implementation requires the distribution of new certificates of title,
which - unsurprisingly, see supra note 108 and accompanying text - has "gone much
slower than many expected." Damian Fraser, Survey of Mexico, Fin. Times (London),
Nov. 10, 1993, at IX
175. See supra part III.D.
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would still allow for the three benefits listed by Ellickson:
redistribution of land from those who do not want it to those who do,
incentives for childless owners to care for and develop the land, and
the ability to use the land as collateral for a loan.
176
By legalizing rental among ejidatarios, the agrarian law allows
for efficient redistribution within the ejido community. As described
above, 7 7 many ejidatarios have been unable to develop their plots
singlehandedly because they lacked vital resources. Others rented their
land out to fellow ejidatarios despite the formal illegality of that
practice. 17 ' Now that the rental market within the ejido has been
legitimated, ejidatarios can make work and sharecropping
arrangements among themselves without aggravating their insecurity
of title. 179 An ejidatario who is considering a move to the city will
make that choice in the context of the common good of the ejido. If
other members of the ejido can make better use of the land than he,
the market within the ejido will encourage him to rent it. Legalized
rental arrangements will increase the efficiency of the community's use
of resources without allowing those vital resources to pass out of the
community into the hands of outside commercial interests.
Sale of land within the ejido will solve problems associated
with intergenerational transfers of land. By being allowed to sell his
land to another member of his community, an ejidatario without
children to whom he can leave his land will still be able to realize some
gain for the investment of his labor in developing the parcel. The
proceeds of the sale can serve as a form of annuity for him in his old
age.8 0 Thus, even though he has no "bequest motive"' to take
care of his land, his ability to convert it to his benefit while he lives
will give him the incentive to develop his property. The ability to
purchase land from older ejidatarios will offer younger members of the
community who cannot look to inherit sufficient land the chance to
remain as farmers in the ejido. In cases where an aging ejidatario has
too many potential heirs to permit efficient yet fair distribution of his
176. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
177. See supra part III.A.
178. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
179. See supra part III.A.2.
180. Ellickson, supra note 144, at 1375.
181. Id.
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land," 2 sale of the land and division of the proceeds among the
beneficiaries will allow the next generation to avoid the trap of
excessive subdivision of land.
Thus far, this Note has discussed how rental and sales between
ejidatarios respectively address the first two of Ellickson's
considerations - efficient redistribution and incentive to develop. A
non-destructive market in land will not be able to realize the third
benefit of transferability, the owner's capacity to mortgage it, as easily.
Pursuant to the 1992 amendments to Article 27, the new
Agrarian Law permits the mortgage of ejidal lands. The costs to
defaulting ejidatarios and their communities are sure to be
significant.1" If, however, the debtor default remedies available to
outside creditors were restricted to transfer of the debtor's land to a
paying ejidatario, then access to private financing might be available
without destroying the community.
Under such a revised regulatory scheme, an ejidatario could
pledge the right to farm his land over a certain period as he can under
the current law. If he were to default, however, the lending bank would
acquire only the right to transfer the land to another ejidatario at the
market rate within the community. Thus, while forfeiture would still
hurt defaulting ejidatarios, the community would not suffer the social
upheaval involved in seeing its property go to outsiders.
Under the revision to the legal framework of the ejido
suggested here, both ejidatarios and creditors would be able to
liquidate the value of ejidal land. The cash or in-kind"s value of the
land would be set within the community according to the land's utility
to other members of the community. This restriction on the potential
list of transferees protects the community's close-knit social structures
from eradication by the agroindustrial culture of multinational food
corporations.
182. Excessive subdivision of lands might render them too small to sustain any one
family. A family that received land from several sources could have its plots in different
parts of the ejido.
183. See supra part III.D.3.
184. Sharecropping, in which a tenant farmer offers some share of the harvest to
the landlord as rent, is the most common form of in-kind rental agreement.
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B. iViva Zapata!'35 - Campesino Demands for Land Justice
Although the Zapatistas' military occupation of major towns in
Chiapas was short-lived,'8s their uprising has become a dialogue of
public opinion 1 7 and has inspired nonviolent direct action by peasant
groups.' 88 Some have suggested that Zapata rides again in this
election year of 1994189 and that, after sixty-five years of
uninterrupted control, the Institutional Revolutionary Party may
finally be turned out of power in Mexico. 9
Indigenous groups in Chiapas, having perceived the threat to
their lifestyle, have demanded a reversal of the Salinas
administration's modernization program. Some of these peasant
farmers have expressed their concern by joining the Zapatista army.
Many, however, have taken advantage of the opportunity presented by
the guerilla uprising to make it clear, through nonviolent means, that
only fundamental economic and political change will bring peace to the
countryside. The heritage of the indigenous farmer stretches back for
centuries. If, through privatization, the international agricultural
market is to destroy this legacy now, it will not do so quietly.
V. CONCLUSION
The ejido structure, as established by Article 27 and the
agrarian regulation prior to 1992, represented the reemergence of the
Aztec capullalli. This ancient indigenous tradition of communal
relationship to the land survived four centuries of assault by private
forms of ownership. Although the encomienda threatened to displace
indigenous landholdings completely, Spain enacted effective
protections; the struggle between the indigenous pueblo and the
hacienda, successor to the encomienda, continued until legislation in
185. Spanish for "Long live Zapata!"
186. Wearne, supra note 173, at 15.
187. Tim Golden, The Voice of the Rebels Has Mexicans in His Spell, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1994, at A3.
188. Tim Golden, 'Awakened' Peasant Farmers Overrunning Mexican Towns, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1994, at Al.
189. Anthony DePalma, In the War Cry of the Indians, Zapata Rides Again, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1994, at A4.
190. Nancy Nusser & Arthur Brice, Did Mexican Rebellion Open Door to Political
Turnover? Ruling Party Faces Real Test, Atlanta Const., Feb. 5, 1994, at A13.
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the latter half of the nineteenth century tipped the scale in favor of the
large private landholdings.
More than a mere legacy of an ancient farming system, the
ejido serves as the only means by which indigenous campesinos will be
able to participate meaningfully in Mexico's agricultural future. The
1992 revisions to Article 27 have marked the return to the
privatization policies embodied in the Ley Lerdo and the Constitution
of 1857. The removal of the legal restraints on a speculative market in
agricultural property will result in the dispossession of hundreds of
thousands of indigenous farmers who will emigrate to the cities of
Mexico and the United States. The loss of the ejido will effectively
mean the end of indigenous agriculture - and, thereby, the end of the
indigenous way of life - in Mexico.
The communal nature of ejidal lands must be protected by
means of appropriate restraints on alienation. A market in land
confined to the limits of the communities themselves would allow
campesinos important flexibility in arranging production without
exposing them to dispossession by outside interests. At the beginning
of 1992, when the Salinas counter-reform became law, these changes
to the nature of the ejido seemed irrevocable. The uprising in Chiapas,
however, has brought new attention to the concerns of indigenous
campesinos throughout Mexico, and Zapata's struggle for land justice
continues.
